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I. INTRODUCTION
So far as I am aware it has never been suggested that the
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) should be copied in its entirety by
Australian legislatures. This is not because of aversion to the idea of
codifying commercial law.' Rather, it is because differences in local
conditions and commercial practices would make such wholesale
copying inappropriate. Awareness of some of the shortcomings of the
UCC identified in the current series of Symposia may also be a factor.
However, this is not to say that Australian lawmakers have ignored
the UCC. On the contrary, particular provisions of the Code have
profoundly influenced the direction of law reform in Australia.
This Article will canvass three prominent examples: Australian
state and federal unconscionability legislation; the Register of
Encumbered Vehicles (REV) project; and proposals for an Australian
Article 9.
The message is that even if the UCC is flawed in one or more of
the ways suggested by its critics, other countries continue to draw
inspiration from its central ideas. In this sense, at any rate, the UCC
is not dead.2
II. UNCONSCIONABILITY
A. Introduction
Unconscionability legislation has been high on the Australian
legislator's agenda over the past decade or so.
The New South Wales Contracts Review Act of 1980 provides for
the reopening of a contract if it is found by a court to be unjust.'
"Unjust" is defined to include "unconscionable, harsh or oppres-
sive."4 In deciding whether a contract is unjust, the court is directed
to have regard to the public interest and all the circumstances of the
case,5 as well as to a list of other factors, including: (1) whether or
not there was any material bargaining inequality between the parties;
1. But see Roy Goode, The Codification of Commercial Law, 14 MoNAsH U. L. REV.
135, 138-39 (1988).
2. Anita F. Hill, Is the UCC Dead or Merely Languishing?, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 651,
658 (1993).
3. Contracts Review Act 1980, No. 16 § 7(1) (N.S.W.) (AustI.).
4. Id § 4(1).
5. Id. § 9(1).
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(2) whether or not the provisions of the contract were the subject of
negotiation; (3) whether or not it was reasonably practicable for the
parties seeking relief to negotiate for alteration or removal of any of
the provisions of the contract; (4) whether or not any of the provi-
sions of the contract imposed conditions which were unreasonable; (5)
whether or not a party to the contract was able to protect their
interests because of age or physical or mental incapacity; (6) the
relative economic circumstances, educational background, and literacy
of the parties; (7) the form and intelligibility of the contract; (8)
whether independent advice was obtained by the party seeking relief;
(9) the extent to which the contract was explained to, and understood
by, the party seeking relief; (10) whether there was any undue
influence, unfair pressure, or unfair tactics exerted on the party
seeking relief; (11) the conduct of the parties in relation to similar
dealings; and (12) the commercial setting of the contract.
6
The Act binds the Crown,7 but the Crown may not be granted
relief under the Act.' Also barred from seeking relief are public and
local authorities, corporations, and a person who enters into a
contract in the course of, or for the purpose of, a trade, business, or
profession-other than a farming undertaking.9 In its application to
buyers, the Act is therefore effectively limited to consumer deal-
ings.'0 However, subject to the limitations just mentioned, a supplier
can claim relief under the Act in a case where the contract is unjust
on the ground of misconduct engaged in by the buyer. In granting
relief the court may refuse to enforce all or any part of the provisions
of the contract, declare the contract void in whole or part, or vary the
contract."
The Act may be relied on either by way of application to the
court, or as a defense to an action brought against the party claiming
relief. 2 New South Wales is the only Australian state so far to have
enacted a Contracts Review Act. However, provisions based on the
text of the New South Wales legislation have been included in the
6. Id § 9(2).
7. Id. § 5.
8. id § 6(1).
9. Id. § 6(2).
10. Baltic Shipping Co. v. Dillon, 22 N.S.W.L.R. 1, 20 (Ct. App. 1991) (Kirby, P.),
rev'd on other grounds, 176 C.L.R. 344 (1993) (Austl.).
11. Contracts Review Act 1980 § 7(1) (N.S.W.).
12. Commercial Banking Co. of Sydney v. Pollard, [1983] 1 N.S.W.L.R. 74 (Sup. Ct.)
(Austl.).
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uniform state consumer credit laws." The main differences are that
the Credit Act provisions catch only credit contracts, such as
consumer loans, conditional sales, credit card transactions, and the
like; and they give relief to debtors only-credit providers cannot sue.
Section 51AB of the Commonwealth Trade Practices Act of 1974,
a federal statute, provides that "A corporation shall not, in trade or
commerce, in connection with the supply or possible supply of goods
or services to a person, engage in conduct that is, in all the circum-
stances, unconscionable."' 4 The provision is limited to consumer
dealings and, as its text makes plain, applies only to the supplier's
conduct. "Conduct" is defined to include the making of a contract,'"
so that entry into a contract which is unconscionable or contains
unconscionable terms would be a contravention. "Conduct" also
includes giving effect to a contract 6 so that, for example, unfair
enforcement or collection tactics might contravene the section. The
focus on conduct means that the section may apply even if no contract
13. Credit Act 1985 pt. IX (Austl. Cap. Terr.) (Austl.); Credit Act 1984, No. 94 pt. 9
(N.S.W.) (Austl.); Credit Act 1987, No. 52 pt. IX (Queensl.) (AustI.), amended by Credit
Amendment Act 1994 (Queensl.) (Austl.); Consumer Credit Act 1972-1973 (S. Austl.)
(Afistl.); Credit Act 1984, No. 10097/1984 pt. IX (Vict.) (Austi.); Credit Act 1984, No. 99
pt. IX (W. Austl.) (AustI.). Proposed new uniform credit laws are currently being
developed, based on a model enacted in Queensland in 1994. Consumer Credit Act 1994,
No. 51 (Queensl.) (Austl.). The new legislation reenacts the unconscionability provisions.
L pt. 4, div. 3.
14. In determining whether conduct is unconscionable, the court may have regard to
the following factors:
(a) the relative strengths of the bargaining positions of the corporation and the
consumer;
(b) whether, as a result of conduct engaged in by the corporation, the consumer
was required to comply with conditions that were not reasonably necessary for
the protection of the legitimate interests of the corporation;
(c) whether the consumer was able to understand any documents relating to the
supply or possible supply of the goods or services;
(d) whether any undue influence or pressure was exerted on, or any unfair
tactics were used against, the consumer or a person acting on behalf of the
consumer by the corporation or a person acting on behalf of the corporation in
relation to the supply or possible supply of the goods or services; and
(e) the amount for which, and the circumstances unu,:r which, the consumer
could have acquired identical or equivalent goods or services from a person
other than the corporation.
Trade Practices Act 1974, AUSTL. C. Acrs § 51AB(2).
A person who suffers loss or damage by reason of a contravention of § 5lAB may
apply for relief. Id. § 87. Relief may take the form, for example, of rescission or variation
of a contract in whole or part, refusal to enforce a contract in whole or part, or an award
of compensation. Id. § 87(2).
15. Id. § 4(1).
16. See id.
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ever results. So, for example, the use by a corporation of harassing
selling techniques might form the basis of a claim under the section,
as might unconscionable conduct in connection with promotional
schemes and giveaways. For reasons that have to do with constitu-
tional limitations on the legislative power of the federal parliament,
section 51AB is by and large limited to conduct that is engaged in by
a corporation. However, mirror-image provisions have been enacted
at the state level, and these apply whether the supplier is incorporated
or not.'7
B. The Influence of Section 2-302
These statutory initiatives were all substantially influenced by
UCC section 2-302. It is true that there are differences in both scope
and drafting style, but the underlying idea is the same. References to
section 2-302 lie at the heart of reform proposals which led to the
enactment of the Australian laws,"8 and the proposals themselves are
justified in terms which echo the official comment to section 2-302.19
17. Fair Trading Act 1992, No. 72 § 13 (Austl. Cap. Terr.) (Austl.); Fair Trading Act
1987, No. 68 § 43 (N.S.W.) (Austl.); Consumer Affairs and Fair Trading Act 1990, No. 49
§ 43 (N. Terr.) (Austl.); Fair Trading Act 1989, No. 84 § 39 (Queensl.) (Austl.); Fair
Trading Act 1987, No. 42 § 57 (S. Austl.) (Austl.); Fair Trading Act 1990, No. 29 § 15
(Tas.) (Austl.); Fair Trading Act 1985, No. 10201 § 11A (Vict.) (Austl.); Fair Trading Act
1987, No. 108 § 11 (W. Austi.) (Austl.).
The state provisions substitute the word "person" for "corporation." E.g., Fair
Trading Act 1990 § 15(1) (Tas.) (stating "a person shall not, in trade or commerce...").
18. THE LAW SCH., UNIVERSITY OF ADELAIDE, REPORT ON THE LAW RELATING TO
CONSUMER CREDIT AND MONEYLENDING 58 (1969) [hereinafter ADELAIDE LAW SCHOOL
COMMITTEE REPORT]; JOHN R. PEDEN, HARSH AND UNCONSCIONABLE CONTRACTS:
REPORT TO THE MINISTER FOR CONSUMER AFFAIRS AND CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETIES AND
THE ATrORNEY-GENERAL FOR NEW SOUTH WALES 13 & app. B (1976) [hereinafter
PEDEN REPORT].
19. The Adelaide Law School Committee Report, having quoted UCC § 2-302 and the
official comment went on to say:
[N]o matter how much legislation is enacted to cope with specific abuses or
malpractices in any area of the law, this will never succeed in providing for all
abuses which exist, or may develop in that area. Thus there is a need for general
residual power vested in the Courts to strike down unreasonable or oppressive
practices.... A power to re-open consumer credit transactions, or clauses in
them, if it is shown that the transaction or clause in question is contrary to
reasonable business practice might be appropriate. A provision similar to § 2-
302(2) of the U.S. Uniform Commercial Code and § 6.111(3) of the Uniform
Consumer Credit Code could spell out what evidence and factors might be
relevant to this.
ADELAIDE LAW SCHOOL COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 18, at 58.
The Peden Report states:
[W]hile often paying lip-service to the sanctity of contract doctrine, the courts
have felt the need to respond to changing needs and expectations in the
April 1996]
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It is not surprising that in interpreting the legislation, Australian
courts have adopted American learning on section 2-302. In an
important early case on the New South Wales Contracts Review Act
of 1980, the leading judgment stated that:
[A] contract may be unjust under the Act because its terms,
consequences or effects are unjust. This is substantive
injustice. Or a contract may be unjust because of the
unfairness of the methods used to make it. This is procedur-
al injustice. Most unjust contracts will be the product of
both procedural and substantive injustice.'
This passage marked the formal reception of Arthur Leff's
procedural-substantive unconscionability dichotomy into Australian
contract law.2' The distinction has been heavily relied on in later
cases. It is generally acknowledged that the legislation provides
greater scope than common law and equitable doctrines for granting
relief in cases of substantive unconscionability.? So, for example, it
has been said that, notwithstanding the last sentence in the passage
just quoted, in an appropriate case gross disparity between the price
of goods or services and their value may justify intervention under the
community and have developed a number of devices to subvert the doctrine of
sanctity of contract in order to do justice in individual cases. These devices
include the extension of the existing principles of duress, undue influence and
illegality, and principles of construction such as the implication of additional
terms, the doctrines of fundamental breach, reading down of exclusion clauses,
the collateral oral warranty device, and the doctrines of frustration and equitable
estoppel.
The main criticisms of the devices referred to in the last paragraph, are not
that they failed to achieve justice in the individual cases to which they were
applied, but that
(a) they do not make a frontal attack on the root cause of the problem,
and by using technical devices the courts invite the contract draftsman to
try again;
(b) they tend to present a multitude of individual decisions which fail to
accumulate experience or authority in marking out the minimal require-
ments of fairness;
(c) since they often turn upon construction of terms which are necessarily
misconstrued to avoid injustice, difficulties are created for the construction
of similar terms in subsequent wholly legitimate contracts.
PEDEN REPORT, supra note 18, at 5-6.
20. West v. AGC (Advances) Ltd., 5 N.S.W.L.R. 610, 620 (Ct. App. 1986) (Austl.)
(McHugh, J.A.).
21. Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause,
115 U. PA. L. REv. 485 (1967).
22. E.g., Mark Sneddon, Unconscionability in Australian Law: Development and
Policy Issues, 14 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 545, 553 (1992).
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statute.' Under the relevant equity doctrines, by contrast, an
excessive price is at best evidence from which procedural unconscio-
nability might be inferred. In a similar connection it has been held
that if one contracting party's consent was affected by a disability,
that may be sufficient to make the contract unjust in the statutory
sense even if the other party was unaware of the situation.24 This is
a form of substantive unconscionability; procedural unconscionability
entails an element of exploitation by the stronger party, but if the
stronger party is unaware of the weaker party's disability, its conduct
in making the contract can hardly be characterized as exploitative. In
equity, by contrast, proof of knowledge-or at least the means of
knowledge-is essential,' and this is consistent with the focus of
equity on procedural irregularities in the contracting process.
C. Impact of the Legislation
It has been suggested that the enactment of the New South Wales
Contracts Review Act of 1980 signalled "the end of much of classical
contract theory in New South Wales."'26 This overstates the posi-
tion,' but there is no doubt that the impact of the legislation has
been very substantial.
Nowhere has its effect been more evident than in the context of
guarantees, particularly where the borrower and guarantor are
members of the same family. A commonly occurring scenario is
where the borrower and guarantor are husband and wife, respectively,
or the borrower is a corporation which the husband controls. The
loan is for the husband's business purposes, and the husband is asked
to put up the family home by way of security. The wife is brought in
because the home is in their joint names so that her signature to the
security document is required.'s Financial counselors have coined
23. West, 5 N.S.W.L.R. at 621 (McHugh, J.A.).
24. Baltic Shipping Co. v. Dillon, 22 N.S.W.L.R. 1, 20 (Ct. App. 1991) (Kirby, P.),
rev'd on other grounds, 176 C.L.R. 344 (1993) (Austl.); Collier v. Morlend Fin. Corp. (Vic.)
Pty., Austl. Consumer Sales & Cred. L. Rep. (CCH) 55-716, at 58,433 (N.S.W. Ct. App.
1989) (Austl.) (Meagher, J.); see Custom Credit Corp. v. Lupi, Austl. Consumer Sales &
Cred. L. Rep. (CCH) § 56-024 (Sup. Ct. Vict. 1991) (Austl.) (en banc).
25. Commercial Bank of Austl. Ltd. v. Amadio, 151 C.L.R 447, 477 (1983) (Austl.)
(Deane, J.).
26. West, 5 N.S.W.L.R. at 621 (McHugh, J.A.).
27. In the same judgment it was also said that the Act "operates within and not
outside the domain of the law of contract." Id. at 631 (McHugh, .A.).
28. Theoretically, of course, the dominant spouse could just as easily be the wife, but
in practice to date this has rarely been the case. That is why feminist lawyers have taken
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the expression "sexually transmitted debt" (STD) to describe this kind
of case-the husband contracts the debt, but the wife ends up sharing
the burden when things go wrong. Feminists and consumer advocates
have combined to mount a vocal campaign against STD. The
unconscionability legislation has proved to be an important weapon
in their armory. The features of STD, and other family guarantee,
cases which tend to attract the legislation are as follows:
" There is often no direct benefit accruing to the guarantor from
the contract, but the cost to the guarantor if things go wrong
may be very high. The cost may include loss of the guaran-
tor's home in cases where it has been given as security to
support the guarantee;29
* The guarantor will often be under considerable pressure from
the borrower to agree to the transaction. This may take many
forms: bullying, cajoling, whining, flattery, threats, and all the
other methods of persuasion that are extant in family circles;
or
" Occasionally the borrower and the credit provider will conspire
to suppress relevant information from the guarantor. For
example, in one leading case, the guarantors, an elderly Italian
couple, assumed liability in respect of their son's business
overdraft unaware that at the time the bank was already
selectively dishonoring the son's checks.3"
In an effort to stave off judicial intervention, credit providers
have increasingly taken to insisting that the guarantor obtain
independent legal and financial advice in advance of transacting. This
precaution has proved to be only partly successful. The urge to
intervene on compassionate grounds is strong. There are numerous
cases where it has been held that the advice was not sufficiently
such an interest in the issue, as the text which follows will explain.
29. The relevance of this consideration to STD cases is problematical. While it may
be true that the immediate benefits of the loan accrue to the husband's business venture,
if the business venture succeeds, the wife will recoup benefits in the form of life-style
improvements. Bank of Credit & Commerce Int'l S.A. v. Aboody, [1990] 1 Q.B. 923, 966-
67 (Eng. C.A. 1989) (Slade, J.). On the other hand, it has been suggested in the context
of the New South Wales Contracts Review Act of 1980 that the courts should discount this
kind of benefit. Beneficial Fin. Corp. v. Comer, Austl. Consumer Sales & Cred. L. Rep.
(CCH) 56-042, 56-686 (Sup. Ct. N.S.W. 1991) (Austl.) (Rogers, C.J.).
30. Commercial Bank of Austl. Ltd. v. Amadio, 151 C.L.R. 447,480-81 (1983) (Austl.)
(Deane, J.) (finding in favor of the guarantor-parents relying on the equitable doctrine of
unconscientious dealing).
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independent,31 or that it was inadequate.32 Occasionally, the court
may be prepared to draw inferences about the adequacy of the advice
from the fact that the guarantor went ahead with the transaction
anyway.33 The reasoning can be reduced to the following syllogism:
31. The cases establish the following.
" the advice is unlikely to be independent if it is given by the credit provider's own
lawyer. O'Brien v. Hooker Homes Pty. Ltd., Austl. Consumer Sales & Cred. L.
Rep. (CCH) 56-217, at 58,269 (Sup. Ct. N.S.W. 1993) (Austl.); Comer, Austl.
Consumer Sales & Cred. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 56-042, at 58,686; McNamara v.
Commonwealth Trading Bank of Austl., 37 S.A. St. R. 232, 241 (Sup. Ct. 1984)
(Austi.) (King, CJ.) (en banc);
" the fact that a lawyer is nominated by the credit provider to advise the guarantor
does not itself prevent the advice from being independent. Collier v. Morlend Fin.
Corp. (Vic.) Pty., Austl. Consumer Sales & Cred. L. Rep. (CCH) 55-716, at
58,433 (N.S.W. Ct. App. 1989) (Austl.);
" the advice is unlikely to be regarded as independent if it is given at the credit
provider's office, or in the presence of the credit provider. Nolan v. Westpac
Banking Corp., Austl. Consumer Sales & Cred. L. Rep. (CCH) 55-930 (Sup. Ct.
S. Austl. 1989);
" the adviser should be independent not only of the credit provider, but also of the
borrower, and the borrower should not be present when the advice is being given.
McNamara, 37 S.A. St. R. at 241 (King, C.J.);
" the responsibility of an adviser cannot be limited by having the guarantor sign a
piece of paper which limits the adviser's functions in the absence of a clear
statement to the guarantor that the advice is not comprehensive and may not be
sufficient for the guarantor's needs. Collier, Austl. Consumer Sales & Cred. L.
Rep. (CCH) 1 55-716 at 55, 430 (Hope, J.A.).
32. The cases suggest the following points:
" clear explanation should be given of the outcome and effect of the transaction,
with particular reference to what it means to give a guarantee and the likely
consequences if the borrower defaults;
" the adviser should explain to the guarantor the terms of the relevant documents,
and this will usually involve more than just reading them through;
* unless the guarantor directs otherwise, advice should also be given about the
propriety of the transaction from the guarantor's point of view, that is, the nature
and extent of the risk confronting the guarantor. Factors relevant to the
guarantor's risk include the following:
* the terms of the document defining the guarantor's liability;
* the borrower's financial situation;
* where the guarantee is given as security for a loan to finance a business
venture, and it is anticipated that the loan repayments will be met out of
the returns from the business, the viability of the venture;
* any unusual features of the transaction between the credit provider and
the borrower that may increase the risk to the guarantor, and
* the guarantor's financial position.
See, e.g., Beneficial Fin. Corp. v. Karavas, 23 N.S.W.L.R. 256, 263-65 (Ct. App. 1991)
(Austi.) (Kirby, P.); Guthrie v. ANZ Banking Group Ltd., N.S.W. Conveyancing L. Rep.
§ 55-463 (Sup. Ct. 1989) (Austl.); Westwill Pty. Ltd. v. Heath, 52 S.A. St. R. 461 (Sup. Ct.
1989) (Austl.) (Duggan, J.); McNamara, 37 S.A. St. R. at 239 (King, C.J.).
33. E.g., Beneficial Fin. Corp. v. Adams (Sup. Ct. N.S.W. May 19,1989) (unreported),
April 1996]
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The transaction was foolhardy from the guarantor's perspective; no
person in their right mind and who had been properly advised would
have agreed to it; therefore, the advice obtained must have been
inadequate-either that, or the guarantor was out of his or her mind.
This kind of degenerative analysis puts the credit provider in a no-win
situation: If the advice is adequate, the guarantor will refuse to
transact; but if the guarantor does transact, the contract Will be struck
down later on the ground that the advice was inadequate. At this
level, procedural unconscionability merges with substantive unconscio-
nability.
For these reasons, the taking of guarantees has become a
decidedly more hazardous enterprise for credit providers than it used
to be. The consequence no doubt has been to restrict the availability
of credit and increase the costs of borrowing for certain classes of
customers. In the STD context the courts are beginning to acknowl-
edge explicitly that there is a trade-off involved between the need to
protect more vulnerable women from being overborne by their
husbands, and "ensure that the wealth currently tied up in the
matrimonial home does not become economically sterile."' In other
words, a wife's freedom from contract is at odds with her freedom to
contract. The more readily courts intervene in favor of married
women, the harder married women will find it in the future to enter
"freely" into contracts of the relevant kind. Australian courts are still
struggling to determine where the balance should be struck."
D. Conclusion
The Australian unconscionability laws are contentious. The
architect of the New South Wales Contracts Review Act of 1980,
Professor John Peden, claimed that it was drafted with a view to:
* making the law "sharp in focus, conceptually sound and
explicit in its policy underpinnings;"
" preserving judicial rigor in the application of the legislation;
and
affd sub nom. Beneficial Fin. Corp. v. Karavas, 23 N.S.W.L.R. 256 (Ct. App. 1991)
(Austl.).
34. Akins v. National Austl. Bank, 34 N.S.W.L.R. 155, 174 (Ct. App. 1994) (Austl.)
(Clarke, J.A.) (quoting Barclays Bank Plc. v. O'Brien, [1994] 1 App. Cas. 180, 188 (1993)
(House of Lords (Eng.)) (Lord Browne-Wilkinson)).
35. See, eg., Akins, 34 N.S.W.L.R. at 168; Warburton v. Whiteley & Ors, 1989 N.S.W.
Conveyancing L. Rep. § 55-453 (N.S.W. Ct. App.) (Austl.).
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* avoiding "ad hocery" in decisionmaking.36
These claims have been questioned in academic writings. It has
been pointed out that the legislation is:
" not "sharp in focus" because it fails to specify where the
balance is to be struck between procedural and substantive
unconscionability concerns. In particular, the list of factors
which the courts are directed to consider when deciding
whether to grant relief is a mish-mash of process-oriented and
outcome-oriented considerations and no attempt is made to
give them any relative weighting;
" not "conceptually sound" because insofar as proof might be
required of procedural unconscionability, no guidance is
offered as to how far this proof might legitimately be derived
by inference from one-sided outcomes. The more readily such
inferences are drawn, the less the distinction between proce-
dural and substantive unconscionability will matter; and
" not "explicit in its policy underpinnings" because it is quite
unclear whether the legislation is motivated primarily, or at all,
by efficiency considerations, distributional considerations, or
paternalistic concerns-depending on how it is interpreted, it
could be made to relate to any of these goals.37
In a recent law review article, a justice of the Australian High
Court made the following observations about the Contracts Review
Act:
Civil litigation has ... increased because courts are
increasingly directed by legislatures to re-arrange people's
legal rights by reference to vague standards which sound
attractive but which are so indefinite that they are extremely
difficult to apply to everyday disputes....
The difficulties in applying such vague criteria [as those
contained in the Contracts Review Act] mean that parties to
contracts have difficulty in knowing what their rights are.
36. JOHN R. PEDEN, THE LAW OF UNJUST CONTRACTS 94-96 (1982).
37. AJ. Duggan, Some Reflections on Consumer Protection and the Law Reform
Process, 17 MONASH U. L. REv. 252,274-76 (1991); see also A.L. Terry, Unconscionable
Contracts in New South Wales: The Contracts Review Act 1980, 10 AUsTL. Bus. L. REV.
311 (1982) (criticizing the growth and ambiguity of legislation for causing an increase in
litigation). But cf John GoIdring, Certainty in Contracts, Unconscionability and the Trade
Practices Act: The Effect of Section 52A, 11 SYDNEY L. REv. 514,534 (1988) (suggesting
legislation expresses the "popular will" and may be "at odds with the values developed by
judges").
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Litigation is forced upon them. When courts have to apply
vague standards, consistency of decision-making-which is
one of the primary benefits of the rule of law-is difficult to
achieve. Moreover, the decision of a court applying such
vague criteria often seems arbitrary. Dissatisfaction with the
decision-maker in particular cases is often the result. In
time, confidence in the judicial system is undermined."
Contrast the views of another prominent Australian judge:
An important factor, in my opinion, in the growing
willingness to use old unconscionability rules more freely,
has been the steadily increasing use in Australia this century
of expansive definitions of unconscionability in both state
and Commonwealth statutes. These have authorised courts
to interfere with contractual relations in a way almost
scandalous to adherents of nineteenth century Anglo-Austra-
lian doctrine and have caused both lawyers and people
regularly encountering contract law to become much more
comfortable with the court's potential presence as a contract
alterer and fixer. In this area of the law the legislatures
appear to have been for a period more responsive to overall
community sentiment than the courts.3 9
There are clear strains in all this of the American debate about
the efficacy of section 2-302.
III. THE REV PROJECT
A. The Current Legislation
All Australian states and territories have enacted legislation
providing for registration of security interests in motor vehicles."
38. M.H. McHugh, The Growth of Legislation and Litigation, 69 AusTL. L.J. 37, 43
(1995).
39. L.J. Priestley, A Guide to a Comparison of Australian and United States Contract
Law, 12 U. NEW S. WALES LJ. 4, 10 (1989) (footnote omitted).
40. Registration of Interests in Goods Act 1990, No. 19 (Austl. Cap. Terr.) (Austl.);
Registration of Interests in Goods Act 1986, No. 37 (N.S.W.) (Austi.); Registration of
Interests in Motor Vehicles and Other Goods Act 1989, No. 85 (N. Terr.) (Austl.); Motor
Vehicles Securities Act 1986, No. 24 (Queensl.) (Austl.); Goods Securities Act 1986, No.
111 (S. Austl.) (Austl.); Motor Vehicle Securities Act 1984, No. 43 (Tas.) (Austi.); Chattel
Securities Act 1987, No. 15 (Vict.) (Austl.); Chattel Securities Act 1987, No. 101 (W.
Austl.) (Austl.).
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The legislation does not extend to registration of title.4' The concern
is with the case where a credit provider has a security interest in a
motor vehicle owned by a borrower, and the borrower without the
credit provider's consent sells the vehicle to a purchaser who buys it
without knowing of the security arrangement.42
The legislation is not uniform, but it is in substance similar from
one jurisdiction to another. It provides for the establishment of an
asset-indexed register. In other words, the security interest is regis-
trable against the vehicle in question. The methods used to separately
identify vehicles for registration purposes currently vary from state to
state and include use of vehicle identification numbers (VIN), regis-
tration plate numbers, and engine and chassis numbers.
Registration is not compulsory, but as a general rule an unregis-
tered security interest will be extinguished in the event of a bona fide
third-party purchase-but not if the security holder has taken
possession.43 Correspondingly, as a general rule, a registered security
interest prevails over a bona fide third-party purchaser. These rules
confront the credit provider with the incentive to register and the
purchaser with the incentive to search. If both parties respond
appropriately, then the borrower's fraud will be discovered before any
transaction with the purchaser takes place. The enactment of the
41. This is in contrast to corresponding United States legislation. See, e.g., UNIF.
MOTOR VEHICLE CERTIFICATE OF TITLE & ANTI-THEFT ACT, 11A U.L.A. 175 (1995).
42. The same concern is evident in the provisions governing perfection of security
interests to be found in United States motor vehicle certificate of title statutes. See, e.g.,
iL §§ 20-21, at 206-13.
43. In most jurisdictions, there are two other exceptions to the rule that a registered
security interest prevails over a bona fide third party purchaser. The first relates to the
case where a dealer gives a security interest over its stock-in-trade (inventory security
interest).
The second exception relates to the case where a vehicle is purchased from a dealer
by a private buyer. In some jurisdictions, a compensation fund has been established to
assist the victims of a motor dealer's misconduct. Failure by the dealer to discharge a
registered security interest before selling a vehicle to the purchaser amounts to misconduct.
If the registered security interest were to prevail in these circumstances, the purchaser
would have a claim against the dealer for breach of contract, failure to transfer clear title,
and if the dealer were judgment-proof, the purchaser would have a claim against the fund.
The end results would be that the credit provider took the automobile, and the purchaser
obtained a money payment.
This represents the reverse of the parties' likely preferred outcomes. A swap would
then have to be negotiated, involving transactions costs on both sides. These transactions
costs can be avoided by giving the credit provider the money claim and the purchaser the
vehicle in the first place, and this is what the legislation seeks to achieve. See, e.g.,
Registration of Interests in Goods Act § 9 (N.S.W.); Chattel Securities Act § 7(2) (Vict.).
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REV statutes has led to a substantial reduction in the incidence of
fraudulent dealings by debtors in automobiles that are the subject of
existing security interests.4
B. The Article 9 Influence
The Australian REV legislation and UCC Article 9 are directed
to different policy objectives. The main concern of the Australian
laws, as already mentioned, is with disputes between security holders
and third-party purchasers. -The main concern of Article 9 is with
priority disputes between competing security holders. This difference
is reflected in the structure of the respective registers. The Australian
REV legislation provides for the establishment of asset-indexed
registers, while Article 9 is based on the concept of a debtor's name-
indexed register. The drawback of a debtor's name-indexed register
for the purpose the Australian REV laws are directed to is that, while
it enables the purchaser to discover all the transfers the borrower has
made, it provides no information about interests in a particular asset
that may have been transferred to a third party by previous owners.
A prospective purchaser will be less interested in knowing about the
borrower's asset dealings at large than about the dealings by the
borrower and others in the particular asset to be purchased. On the
other hand, the drawbacks of an asset indexed register for Article 9
purposes are as follows: an asset-indexed register will not disclose
information about all the security interests the borrower has created;
asset-indexed registration is only possible for assets that have unique
identifiers, such as serial numbers and the like; and, more particularly,
an asset-indexed registration system does not enable the recording of
information relating to unascertained goods until they have become
ascertained.
A debtor's name-indexed register is not subject to these
limitations. Despite these basic points of difference, the Article 9
influence is still very evident in the Australian REV legislation,
particularly the Chattel Securities Acts of Victoria and Western
Australia. The most significant debt the Australian laws owe to the
American model is the approach of regulating according to the
substance rather than the form of security transactions. The
legislation catches all transactions intended as security, whether in the
44. John Holloway, National Register of Encumbered Vehicles, Address Before the
Business Law Education Centre Third Annual Credit Law Conference (1993), in 2 1993
CRED. L. CoNF. 335-36 (1993).
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form of a mortgage or a title retention device. As in the case of
Article 9, the parties are free to adopt whatever form of transaction
they choose, but the form chosen does not determine the statutory
outcome.
The Victorian and Western Australian statutes follow the Article
9 lead in adopting the neutral expression "security interest" to
describe the range of transactions intended to be covered. In both
statutes security interest is defined as follows:
"Security interest" means an interest in or a power over
goods (whether arising by or pursuant to an instrument or
transaction) which secures payment of a debt or other
pecuniary obligation or the performance of any other
obligation and includes any interest in or power over the
goods of a lessor, owner or other supplier of goods, but does
not include a possessory lien or pledge.45
The origins of this provision in UCC section 9-102 are clear
enough, despite the differences in wording. 6
The Victorian and Western Australian statutes also borrow the
key Article 9 concepts of attachment and perfection. In relation to
attachment the legislation provides as follows:
For the purposes of this Act-
(a) a security interest attaches at the time at which
value is given by the secured party and the debtor has
45. Chattel Securities Act 1987, No. 15 § 3(1) (Vict.) (Austl.); Chattel Securities Act
1987, No. 101 § 3(1) (W. Austl.) (Austl.).
46. UCC § 9-102 provides in relevant part as follows:
(1) Except as otherwise provided in Section 9-104 on excluded transactions, this
Article applies
(a) to any transaction (regardless of its form) which is intended to create
a security interest in personal property or fixtures including goods, docu-
ments, instruments, general intangibles, chattel paper or accounts; and also
(b) to any sale of accounts or chattel paper.
(2) This Article applies to security interests created by contract including
pledge, assignment, chattel mortgage, chattel trust, trust deed, factor's lien,
equipment trust, conditional sale, trust receipt, other lien or title retention
contract and lease or consignment intended as security. This Article does not
apply to statutory liens except as provided in Section 9-310.
U.C.C. § 9-102 (1994); see also UNIF. MOTOR VEHICLE CERTIFICATE OF TITLE & ANTI-
THEFT Acr § 1, 11 U.L.A. 175, 183 (1995) (defining terms as they are used in the Act).
The Uniform Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title and Anti-Theft Act defines security
interest as "an interest in a vehicle reserved or created by agreement and which secures
payment or performance of an obligation. The term includes the interest of a lessor under
a lease intended as security." Id. § 1(k).
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rights in the goods or at such later time as the secured
party and the debtor intend; and
(b) an agreement to which a debtor is party which
contains a provision to the effect that the debtor takes
the goods on lease or hire-purchase or creates a security
interest over the goods shall be deemed to give value to
the debtor.47
This provision is modeled on UCC section 9-203.
The legislation identifies two ways in which the holder of a
security interest in a motor vehicle may obtain protection against
third-party claims, namely by taking possession of the vehicle or
registering the security interest.48 The legislation does not actually
use the term "perfection" to describe this process, but the notion is
implicit in the provision just referred to.
49
In common with Article 9, registration under the REV statutes
is achieved by notice filing. By contrast, other Australian registration
schemes provide for document filing.0 The drafters of the REV
statutes recognized the superiority of the Article 9 approach. The
information required from a security holder should be the minimum
necessary to alert a searcher to the existence of the prior entitlement.
If further information is required, it can be obtained upon request
from the security holder.5 ' As previously mentioned, registration
47. Chattel Securities Act 1987 § 3(4) (Vict.); Chattel Securities Act 1987 § 3(4) (W.
Austl.). The concept of attachment is used to determine the application of the statute.
So, for example, § 4(1) of the Victorian Act provides:
The provisions of this Part (other than section 5) apply (notwithstanding
anything to the contrary in any other Act or law) to and in respect of a security
interest (whether created within or outside Victoria) if the goods the subject of
the security interest-
(a) are at the date of attachment of the security interest situated in
Victoria; or
(b) are for the time being situated in Victoria.
Chattel Securities Act 1987 § 4(1) (Vict.).
48. See id. § 7(2); Chattel Securities Act 1987 § 7(2) (W. AustI.). Whether or not the
third party has notice of the security interest is irrelevant. Chattel Securities Act 1987
§ 7(2) (Vict.); Chattel Securities Act 1987 § 7(2) (W. Austl.).
49. The requirements for perfection under Article 9 are set out in UCC § 9-302(1).
50. For example, the state bills of sale legislation: Instruments Act 1933 (Austl. Cap.
Terr.) (Austl.); Bills of Sale Act 1898, No. 10 (N.S.W.) (Austi.); Instruments Act 1935 (N.
Terr.) (Austl.); Bills of Sale and Other Instruments Act 1955, No. 16 (Queensl.) (Austl.);
Bills of Sale Act 1886, No. 389 (S. Austl.) (Austl.); Bills of Sale Act 1900, No. 70 (Tas.)
(AustI.); Bills of Sale Act 1899, No. 45 (W. Austl.) (Austl.).
51. Other disadvantages of document filing include the following:
i. It is commercially impracticable where the security is of a kind which is
constantly changing, such as accounts receivable or dealers' inventory [unless the
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under the REV statutes is not compulsory. This feature of the
legislation is also consistent with the Article 9 approach. By contrast,
under other Australian registration statutes, failure to register is a
criminal offense52 or, alternatively, results in avoidance of the secur-
ity transaction as between the parties themselves.5" Where the
purpose of registration is to resolve competing claims to personal
property, formal sanctions for noncompliance are unnecessary. It is
sufficient if priority is made to turn on whether the security interest
is registered. Then it will be a matter for the business judgment of
the credit provider to decide whether or not the cost of registering the
security interest is outweighed by the risk of postponement or
extinguishment in the event of nonregistration. By contrast, where
registration is compulsory, it falls to the legislature to make this kind
of judgment in determining whether or not to grant exemptions from
the registration requirement. It is questionable whether legislatures
are better placed than the parties themselves to make such cost-
benefit assessments.54
C A National Register
The REV legislation led to the establishment of separate registers
in each state. This created problems in the commonly occurring case
where an automobile, the subject of a security interest created in state
1, was removed by the debtor to state 2 before being sold. The REV
statutes have been interpreted as meaning that registration of a
security interest in state 1 will not protect the security holder in these
security is in the form of a floating charge].
ii. It precludes the creditor from getting anything on the file until the debtor
has actually signed the security agreement ....
iii. Where the security agreement is lengthy, the obligation to prepare an extra
copy for filing is inconvenient.
iv. The security agreement may contain provisions which are not relevant to
the security and which neither party wishes to make public.
v. The accumulation of lengthy security agreements of varying sizes is
administratively inconvenient and impedes computerisation of records.
CONSUMER CREDIT COMMITTEE, REPORT, 1971, CMND 4596, 5.7.49 [hereinafter
CONSUMER CREDIT COMMITTEE]; AJ. DUGGAN & S.W. BEGG, QUEENSLAND LAW
REFORM COMM'N DISCUSSION PAPER No. 39 & LAW REFORM COMM'N OF VICTORIA
DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 28, PERSONAL PROPERTY SECURITIES LAW: A BLUEPRINT FOR
REFORM 1 2.1.4(c) (1992) [hereinafter QLRCAVLRC DISt:uSSION PAPER].
52. E.g., Corporations Law §§ 263(1), 1131 (Austl.) (registration of company charges).
53. E.g., Instruments Act 1958, No. 6279/1958 pt. IX (Vict.) (Austl.) (providing for
registration of assignments of book debts (receivables)).
54. QLRCVLRC DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 51, 2.1A(b).
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circumstances." Accordingly, hitherto it has been necessary for a
credit provider to register its security interest in each state in order to
be sure of obtaining comprehensive protection. If the reverse rule
applied, registration in one state would be sufficient, but then there
would be the problem-of searchers having to search each state register
in order to be sure of their position. Either way, therefore, multiple
registers result in duplication of effort by system users.
The optimal solution would be to replace the various state
registers with a single national register of motor vehicle security
interests. There has been strong support from the finance and
automobile industries for such a development,56 but it has not
materialized. The main reason is that the two most populous states,
Victoria and New South Wales, were unable to agree on the location
of the national register. This is a depressing, if familiar enough,
outcome in the Australian federal system. Fortunately, the proposal
was not abandoned altogether, and a form of compromise has
emerged. Under the new arrangements separate data bases will be
maintained in New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, and
Western Australia with Queensland and the Territories working off
the New South Wales data base. Computer links will be established
between all data bases to form a single registration network. The link
between the Victorian and New South Wales data bases is already in
place. The system works as follows. Within twenty-four hours of a
security interest being registered in one state, details of the entry are
transmitted to the other state and entered on the register there. The
entry is thereupon treated as registered for the purposes of that state's
legislation.
55. Douglas Fin. Consultants Pty. Ltd. v. Price, [1992] 1 Q.R. 243, 251-53 (Sup. Ct.
1991) (Austl.) (Thomas, J.).
56. In 1991 the finance and automobile industries, in conjunction with state and
territory governments, commissioned Ernst & Young, a firm of chartered accountants, to
carry out a feasibility study for the development of a national register. The study found
compelling technical, operational, and financial reasons for the establishment of a central
data base to support a national register. It recommended that customer services should
continue to be provided by individual states, but using the national data base. The
national data base would be operated, as a commercial venture, by a limited liability
company formed for the purpose, in which shares would be held by the participating states
and territories. ERNST & YOUNG, FEASIBILITY STUDY OF A NATIONAL VEHICLE
SECURITY REGISTER: FINAL REPORT TO AUSTRALIAN FINANCE CONFERENCE
OPERATORS OF VEHICLE SECURITY REGISTERS, MOTOR TRADES ASSOCIATION OF
AUSTRALIA, AUSTRALIAN FEDERATION OF CREDIT UNIONS LTD. (1991) (on file with
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
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A compensation scheme has been established to cover system
errors occurring in the transfer of data from one register to the other.
In such a case the security holder is at risk, because the security
interest will be unregistered in state 2, and it is therefore liable to be
defeated by a third-party purchaser in accordance with the laws of
state 2. The basis of the scheme is that compensation for system
errors will be payable in the first instance by the state whose law
governs the dispute between the security holder and the third-party
purchaser. Two main kinds of system error are possible: transmission
errors and reception errors.
Victoria and New South Wales have entered into an inter-
governmental arrangement to deal with the sharing of responsibility
for such errors. The gist is as follows. If Victoria is liable to
compensate the security holder, but the case is one of transmission
error by New South Wales, then Victoria will be entitled to an
indemnity from New South Wales. On the other hand, if the case is
one of reception error-in other words, the fault lies at the Victorian
end-then Victoria will be left to bear the compensation cost. There
is a mirror-image set of provisions to cover the case where compensa-
tion is payable to the security holder in the first instance by New
South Wales.
D. Conclusion
As already mentioned, the Australian REV legislation is similar
in concept to the provisions governing perfection of security interests
which are to be found in many motor vehicle certificate of title
statutes in the United States.5 7 The main difference is that the
Australian registers are fully computerized. Also, the main registers
have been computer cross-linked in the first stage of a project that it
is still hoped will lead ultimately to the establishment of a single
national register. These initiatives are directed to resolving the kinds
of conflict of laws problems that continue to bedevil the American
system.8
57. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
58. See U.C.C. § 9-103 cmt. (1994).
April 1996] 1009
1010 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
IV. THE AUSTRALIAN ARTICLE 9 PROPOSAL
A. The Current Legislation
Apart from the REV statutes, current Australian laws governing
personal property securities are subject to many of the same criticisms
that were made of the pre-Article 9 laws in the United States.
There is currently no single comprehensive debtor's name-
indexed register of security interests. The Australian Corporations
Law establishes a register of company charges. This has the advan-
tage of being a national register, so that multiple registration and
search efforts at the state level are avoided. However, its scope is
otherwise limited in the following respects: It covers only security
interests in the strict sense (mortgages and charges), and it does not
extend to functionally equivalent transactions (for example, condition-
al sales, leases, outright assignments of receivables); it applies only to
charges (security interests) created by corporations, and security
interests created by other kinds of business debtors are left out of
account; and it does not extend to all kinds of personal property (for
example, while a charge on a book debt (receivable) is registrable, a
charge on a non-trading debt such as a bank account probably is not).
Other criticisms that can be made of the Corporations Law are
as follows:
" the registration requirements are heavy-handed and clumsy.
In particular, registration depends on document filing (lodg-
ment of the security instrument itself), and registration is
compulsory (failure to register is a criminal offense on the part
of the debtor company);
" the statutory priority rules set out in the Corporations Law are
complex and unsatisfactory. In a dispute between two
competing security holders, A and B, in relation to an asset
owned by a debtor corporation, under the Corporations Law
the general rule is that B will obtain priority over A if A's
security interest is not registered, or is registered after B's, and
B has no notice of A's security interest at the time of transact-
ing with the debtor corporation. By contrast, under Article 9
knowledge gained outside the filing system is irrelevant: the
basic rule is a pure first-to-file rule, and exceptions to the rule
[Vol. 29:991
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are based on functional considerations rather than formal
variables.5 9
The register of company charges is not the only debtor's name-
indexed register of security interests. There are also numerous spe-
cialist registers established by state laws relating to particular kinds of
property. Examples include bills of sale registers covering assign-
ments of goods both outright and by way of security where the
assignor remains in possession; a register for assignments of book
debts (receivables); and registers for securities over livestock, wool,
sugar cane, and fruit.
In contrast to the Corporations Law, these state laws are not
necessarily limited to the case where the debtor is a corporation.
They coexist uneasily with the Corporations Law registration
requirements. There are provisions governing cases of overlap, to the
effect that registration of a security interest under the Corporations
Law removes the need for registration also under the relevant state
law.' However, while on the one hand these provisions reduce the
costs of registration, on the other hand they undermine the state
registers and add to the costs of searching. Considerable savings
could be made by collapsing the specialist registers and the register of
company charges into a single, comprehensive system.
B. The Article 9 Proposal
In 1989 the New Zealand Law Commission (NZLC) produced a
report recommending the adoption in that country of legislation based
on the Article 9 model.6' A draft bill was appended based on the
text of the British Columbia version.62
Twelve months later the Australian Law Reform Commission
(ALRC) was given a reference on the topic of personal property
securities by the Commonwealth attorney-general. The reference
gave as one object the desirability of harmonizing Australian and New
Zealand laws, and it directed the ALRC to take account of the
NZLC's report. The Law Reform Commissions of New South Wales,
59. In other words, the Corporations Law is a "notice statute," while Article 9 is a
"race statute." For an explanation of why race statutes are superior, see Douglas Baird
& Thomas Jackson, Information, Uncertainty, and the Transfer of Property, 13 J. LEGAL
STUD. 299, 312-18 (1984).
60. Corporations Law § 273.
61. NEW ZEALAND LAW COMM'N, A PERSONAL PROPERTY SEcuRITIEs AcT FOR
NEW ZEALAND REP. No. 8, at 6-8 (1989).
62. Personal Property Security Act, S.B.C., ch. 36 (1989) (Can.).
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Victoria, and Queensland were also given references on the topic by
their respective governments and it was contemplated that the four
commissions would work cooperatively towards the production of a
joint report.
All four participating commissions agreed that the present state
of the law was unsatisfactory, and that the solution lay in adoption of
the Article 9 model. 6' In a departure from the North American
scheme, it was agreed that there should be a single national register
rather than separate registers in each state. Unfortunately, the
commissions were unable to agree on two key points relating to
implementation of the proposals.
The first point of disagreement had to do with federal-state
relations. The ALRC is a federal body charged with oversight of
federal laws. Not surprisingly, it favored implementation of the
Article 9 reforms via federal legislation. The trouble with this
proposal is that comprehensive personal property securities legislation
lies beyond the constitutional reach of the federal parliament. The
best that could be achieved at the federal level is legislation covering
security interests created by corporate debtors, based on the power of
the parliament to make laws with respect to corporations. The
ALRC, in recognition of this limitation, recommended the inclusion
of Article 9 reforms in the Corporations Law by way of substitution
for the existing provisions governing registration of company charges.
It expressed the hope that the states would enact mirror-image
statutes to cover security interests created by noncorporate debtors.
In that way the gaps in coverage would be filled. However, this
scheme would require uniform legislation enacted simultaneously in
all the states and territories, and the ALRC failed to suggest any
mechanism for coordinating the enterprise. (There is no equivalent
to the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
in Australia.) .Experience with legislation in other fields has shown
that, in the absence of a formal cooperative arrangement between the
states and the Commonwealth, the pursuit of uniformity is likely to
prove elusive.
The Queensland Law Reform Commission (QLRC) and Victoria
Law Reform Commission (VLRC) proposed a cooperative arrange-
63. LAW REFORM COMM'N DISCUSSION PAPER 52 & LAW REFORM COMM'N OF NEW
SOUTH WALES DISCUSSION PAPER 28, PERSONAL PROPERTY SECURITIES 21 (1992)
(Austl.); QLRCVLRC DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 51; LAW REFORM COMM'N,
PERSONAL PROPERTY SECURITIES REP. No. 64 § 4.4, at 40 (1993) (Austl.).
[Vol. 29:991
UCC INFLUENCE IN AUSTRALIA
ment under which a model statute would be developed for adoption
by each of the states and territories on a uniform basis. The model
statute would cover security interests created by corporate and
noncorporate business debtors alike. There would be a single
national register of security interests, established pursuant to the
cooperative .arrangement, and this would act as the register for the
purpose of each state and territory law. In the event that a single
national register was not achievable, the commissions recommended
the establishment of computer-linked state registers along the lines of
the REV model. The objective would be to ensure that a single filing
in one state was sufficient to secure registration on all registers, and
all registers would be covered by a single search.
To the same end, the Article 9 register(s) would be computer
linked with the asset-indexed REV registers, and in due course also
with the shipping register and other asset-indexed systems.
The second point of disagreement between the commissions was
over the drafting approach. The ALRC, attempting to give effect to
plain English considerations, drafted a bill which departed radically
from the Article 9 text. The QLRC and VLRC were highly critical
of the ALRC's bill. They argued that it amounted to reinventing the
wheel and that this entailed substantial costs, including loss of the
opportunity to key into North American case law and literature on
Article 9 and the increased likelihood of error.
As it turned out, the bill was riddled with both conceptual and
drafting errors and it was quite unsuitable for enactment. The QLRC
and VLRC held out for a statute based on the North American text,
with modifications to take account of differences in local conditions.
This is consistent with the approach the NZLC had taken and with
which the Australians were supposed to have been harmonizing.
The disagreements remain unresolved, and no action has been
taken on any of the recommendations. Meanwhile, the New
Zealanders have been reluctant to proceed with their initiative in the
absence of a corresponding development in Australia. Attempts are
continuing in Australia to revive the initiative, but progress is slow.
The reason has only partly to do with the unresolved differences
between the Law Reform Commissions. Perhaps more important is
the lack of enthusiasm in business and legal circles for the reforms.
It has proved difficult to persuade industry that the costs of change
are outweighed by the costs of persevering with the present system.
A "better the devil you know" attitude prevails. So far as many
lawyers are concerned, there are two additional influences at work.
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Practitioners expert in the field of secured financing have a vested
interest in preserving their store of existing legal knowledge, while the
inexpert are affected by the customary excess of caution that
ignorance inspires.64 This state of affairs will be familiar enough to
American readers. Karl Llewellyn encountered similar obstacles in
the course of his campaign on behalf of the UCC.5 Without a
campaigner of Llewellyn's stature, drive, and commitment, reforms of
this order will always be difficult to achieve. That is the real problem
in Australia and other countries outside North America, including
New Zealand and the United Kingdom, where Article 9 law reform
proposals are gathering dust.
V. CONCLUSION
The main purpose of this Article has been to demonstrate the
influence of the UCC on Australian law reform. However, I have
also attempted to highlight the contributions of Australian expertise
to the local end product, including the development of computerized
asset-indexed registers for security interests in automobiles; the
computer-linking of state asset-indexed registers under the REV
scheme and the proposals for computer-linking an Article 9 debtors'
name-indexed register with existing asset-indexed registers of security
interests; and the proposal for a national Article 9 register supported
by uniform state laws and a state-Commonwealth inter-governmental
agreement.
My colleague, Simon Begg, is keen to see the reforms taken
further than this.66 In particular he argues that there is no logical
reason for concentrating on personal property and leaving land out of
account. Nor is it sensible to establish asset-indexed registers, such as
the REV registers, which deal with disputes involving security
interests but leave ownership disputes out of account.67 His proposal
is for a scheme with the following features:
a comprehensive debtor's name-indexed register of security
interests in all kinds of property including land; separate asset-
64. See Goode, supra note 1, at 155.
65. See, e.g., Karl Llewellyn, Why a Commercial Code?, 22 TENN. L. REv. 779,779-80
(1953); Karl N. Llewellyn, Why We Need the Uniform Commercial Code, 10 U. FLA. L.
REV. 367 (1957).
66. Simon Begg, Personal Property Securities Law Reform: Security and Title Registers,
in BANKING LAW AND PRACTICE 280 (1994).
67. Contrast the United States motor vehicle certificate of title statutes. See supra
notes 41-42.
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indexed registers for each class of asset that lends itself to
indexing, including land; the asset-indexed registers to be
registers of title as well as security interests;
" all registers to be computer cross-linked so as to facilitate one-
stop registration and searching;
" an integrated system of priority rules;
" all relevant legislation to be drafted on the basis of common
concepts and definitions-"security interest," "attachment,"
"perfection," and the like.68
It is timely to draw these Australian initiatives to the attention
of American readers, given that Article 9 is to be revised. If they
prove to be relevant in the revision, then the debt Australia owes the
UCC will at least partly have been repaid.
68. A fuller account of Begg's proposal is reproduced as an Appendix to this Article.
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APPENDIX
REGISTERS OF AUSTRALIAN PROPERTY (ROAP)
A proposal for the establishment of an integrated system of registers
incorporating and reforming existing registers.t
I. NAME INDEXED REGISTER (NIR)
Important features and rules
A. Only one NIR for all of Australia indexed with reference to the
names of all corporations and registered business names.
Individuals who carry on business would be permitted to register;
that is include their names in the index;
B. Provides for the registration of security interests over the
property of all debtors whose names are included in the index;
C. Replaces Part 3.5 of the Corporations Law and registers for bills
of sale, crop liens, stock mortgages, wool liens, and securities
over book debts (Instruments Act 1958, No. 6279/1958 pt. IX
(Vict.) (Austl.));
D. Provides for the priority that one security interest over any item
of property of a debtor, whether the debtor's name is included in
the index or not, has vis-a-vis another security interest over that
item of property and vis-,-vis creditors of the debtor who do not
have a security interest over that item of property;
E. Provides for the circumstances in which a purchase of property
which is subject to a security interest will result in the extinguish-
ment of that security interest;
E Defers to the rules of a relevant property indexed register (PIR)
except:
1. Where security interests over an item of property of a
debtor whose name is included in the index compete, or
2. Where there is a competition between a security interest
over an item of property of a debtor whose name is in-
cluded in the index and creditors of that debtor who do
not have a security interest over that item of property
t The following is a summary version of Begg, supra note 66.
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[the effect is that PIRs regulate competition between security
interests and purchasers];
G. Adopts common features for all ROAPs and in particular
1. Functional definition of security interest;
2. Wide definition of property.
II. PROPERTY INDEXED REGISTERS (PIR)
Important features and rules
A. A separate PIR for each class of property that lends itself to
indexing, for example:
1. Land (Torrens Registers)
2. Ships (Australian Shipping Register)
3. Motor vehicles (REVs)
4. Shares (CHESS)
5. Aircraft
6. Patents
7. Trademarks
8. Debt instruments traded on the short term money
market (Austraclear)
9. Mortgages of land (Torrens Registers)
10. Leases of land (Torrens Registers)
B. Each FIR would be indexed with reference to a distinguishing
number or numbers of the property (for example, volume and
folio with respect to land and registered number and chassis
number with respect to motor vehicles);
C. Ideally there would be only one PIR in Australia for each class
of property. However, there would clearly be separate FIRs for
land in each Australian jurisdiction (and the same would clearly
also apply to mortgages of land and leases of land);
D. Each FIR should provide for title to the property that is included
in the index and that title should, unequivocally, vest in the
person shown by the register to be the proprietor of that title;
E. It is recognized, however, that FIRs that provide for registered
title are currently the exception rather than the rule and
accordingly, the establishment of FIRs of title will occur over
time;
F. Each PIR will also provide for registration of security interests
over items of property included in the index;
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G. Each PIR will provide for the priority that a security interest
over any item of property included in the index has vis-A-vis
another security interest over that item of property, whether
either or both security interests are registered, recorded in the
register, subject to any contrary provision of the rule of the NIR.
[The effect is that the NIR regulates competition between
security interests over property of debtors whose names are
included in the MR index in priority to the rules of the PIR];
H. Each PIR will provide for the circumstances in which a purchase
of property included in the index will result in the extinguishment
of a security interest over that property, whether the security
interest is registered-recorded-in the PIR or not;
I. Adopt common features of all ROAP registers and in particular:
1. Functional definition of title
2. Functional definition of security interest
3. Functional definition of purchaser and purchase.
III. COMMON FEATURES OF ALL REGISTERS OF AUSTRALIAN
PROPERTY
A. Common nomenclature and text including the following key
definitions and concepts:
1. Attachment
2. Debtor
3. Extinguishment of security interest
4. Perfection
5. Priority
6. Property
7. Purchase
8. Purchaser
9. Register, or record
10. Security interest
11. Secured party
12. Title
B. Priority accorded to security interests or title according to a first
to register, or record, rule and, in the absence of registration, in
the order of attachment;
C. Common rules for tacking that the first security interest has
priority for all money expressed to be secured thereunder,
including future and contingent indebtedness;
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D. A security interest registered in a PIR is not usually extinguished
by a purchase of the subject property-exceptions to be on
rational grounds;
E. In the absence of fraud, priority is not affected by notice of a
competing interest;
F. The ability to register-record-proposed transactions so as to
secure priority from the date of the transaction; paramountcy of
the register with exceptions, if any, to be justified on functional
grounds;
G. Immediate indefeasibility, that is persons dealing with a person
whose interest is registered to be entitled to registration of that
dealing, in the absence of fraud, notwithstanding that the
registered interest was wrongly registered;
H. Search certificates and any certificate as to title is merely
evidence of what is registered-recorded-in the register;
I. Remote terminal computer access to the registers, NIR and PIRs,
for searching, registering-recording-and deleting with appropri-
ate security protection in the latter two cases;
J. Insurance fund to compensate persons who suffer loss of
property, security, or money due to system error:
1. Failure to register-record-or inaccurate registra-
tion-recording
2. Wrongful extinguishment
3. Inaccurate search certificate;
K. Computer cross-linking:
1. Between each PIR and the NIR so as to facilitate:
" Single stop searching, registration-recording-and
deleting;
* Where there are separate jurisdictions based PIRs
for a single class of moveable property, ensuring
that all items of property are indexed in each PIR;
L. Consistency with Article 9 of the Unites States UCC and its
Canadian counterparts except where there is a rational reason to
the contrary;
M. Common integrated provisions for review of operation and
amendment, including reference to an expert review panel.
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